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Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and
International Community in Mozambique
Abstract
With the heavy involvement of the United Nations (UN) and the international community, the Rome
General Peace Agreement of 1992 ended more than 16 years of civil war in Mozambique. The peace
agreement and post-conflict initiatives by the international community was successful in transforming the
Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) from a rebel group into a viable political party. Key
components of the United Nations and the broader international community success in negotiating peace
and creating conditions for political stability and democracy in Mozambique were (a) the provision of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) before democratisation, (b) decentralization of
humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial and district levels, (c) provision of financial support directly
for the development of political parties, and (d) budget support to sectors relevant to peacebuilding.
Though imperfect, Mozambique remains an important case study in how the UN and international
community can help in post-conflict environments. Thus, the paper argues that success in peacebuilding
operations depends on credible and impartial international support through the UN, as opposed to
peacebuilding operations through the United States of America or Russia.
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Transition from Civil War to Peace:
The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique
Ayokunu Adedokun

Throughout the 1980s, Mozambique was often labelled as an unlikely candidate for
sustainable peace and post-war democratization by international aid agencies and donor
communities, with persuasive reasons. For one, Mozambique was officially the poorest country in
the world, with the lowest GDP per capita contraction (averaging -7.7 percent per year), and
extremely poor infrastructure and productive economic assets—both human and physical
(Adedokun, 2016; Jones & Olken, 2005; Manning, 2002). For another, Mozambique lacked all
the desirable pre-conditions usually held to be conducive to sustainable peace and democracy,
including weak political institutions, non-functional state bureaucracy, low rule of law, no
democratic experience, and low degree of civic culture (Adedokun, 2016; Manning, 2002).
Finally, Mozambique was plagued by one of the most brutal civil wars in the world that lasted
sixteen years (1977-1992), cost more than one million lives, and left nearly six million people
displaced—that is, 4.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.5 million refugees
(Miller & Ferris, 2015).
Yet, since 4 October 1992, when the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in
Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo), led by President Joaquim Chissano,
and the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), led by Aphonso
Dhlakama, the country has successfully undertaken three crucial transitions. These are: From war
to peace; from one-party state to formal liberal democracy; and from state-centered economy to
market economy. After the peace agreement, thousands of refugees returned to their home and
thousands of ex-combatants were demilitarized. Post-civil war democratization, while not without
challenges, has been relatively successful. Since 1994, Mozambique has conducted five
presidential and parliamentary elections. All of them have been held on schedule, most recently
on 15 October 2014. Mozambique’s post-conflict economy also grew at high rates, with GDP
growth at levels averaging 7.5 percent per annum over 1994-2014, buoyed by high levels of
foreign aid and private foreign investment (African Development Bank, 2015).
Mozambique has made great leaps in terms of human development and well-being. For
instance, infant mortality rates have declined from 175 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1975, to

about 70 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011. Between 1980 and 2013, Mozambique’s life
expectancy at birth increased by 7.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.5 years, and
expected years of schooling increased by 4.7 years (UNDP, 2014). This is a surprising
development in many ways, considering Mozambique’s unfavorable initial conditions before,
during, and shortly after the civil war. It is thus worth asking: How did Mozambique make the
leap from violent conflict to “sustainable peace”? Put differently, what factors account for the
successful transition from civil war to peace in Mozambique?
Based on extensive primary research this paper scrutinizes some of the most prominent
ideas that surround Mozambique’s trajectory—namely, that its peacebuilding endeavor has been a
success (Manning, 2002; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & Zartman, 2008) based on the “end of the
Cold War” (Berman, 1996), “drought” (Ohlson, Stedman, & Davies, 1994), “military stalemate”
(Lloyd, 1995), “luck” (Vines, 1998; Hume, 1994), and heavy “donor support” (Ball & Barnes,
2000; Manning & Malbrough, 2009).
While refraining from wholly dismissing these accounts, I argue that Mozambique’s
relative peace and stability since 1992 is largely due to three complementary factors: (1) local
participation in, and local ownership of, the peace process; (2) the persistence of an “inclusive
elite bargain”; and (3) credible and impartial international support through the United Nations. I
shall focus my discussion in this paper on the last point. Namely, that credible and impartial
international support through the United Nations contributed to Mozambique’s relative peace and
stability. I am not the first to discover that the United Nations and the broader international
community played a prominent, and perhaps determinant, role in the implementation of
Mozambican peace process. Alden (1995), Stedman (1997), Manning (2002), and Bekoe (2008)
have written on the same subject. However, the mechanisms and strategies adopted by the UN
and the international community in Mozambique is yet to be fully explored in the literature. In
this paper, I show that any assessment of the UN’s role and performance as well as that of the
international community in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation
and understanding of four causal mechanisms or instruments, namely: (1) Disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) before democratization strategy; (2) Humanitarian
assistance; (3) political and electoral assistance; and (4) budget support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: research methodology and design; a brief
background on the causes of civil war in Mozambique: external vs. internal causes; legacies of the
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war in Mozambique; peace initiatives in Mozambique; theoretical argument on why the United
Nations and the broader international community is key to peacebuilding; the analysis of the four
UN strategies that have contributed to sustainable peace in Mozambique; and a conclusion.
Research Methodology and Design
In order to investigate and empirically analyze the drivers of peace and stability in
Mozambique, a qualitative case study-oriented research design was employed. Case studies, by
definition, are rich, empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context
are not evident (Yin, 2014; Gerring, 2016). By emphasizing the study of a phenomenon within its
real-world context, the case study method favors the collection of data in natural settings,
compared with relying on “derived” data (Bromley, 1986, p. 23).
From the perspective of this research, the main strengths of a single case study are at least
three-fold. First, I utilize a single qualitative case study design in order to focus on detailed, indepth data collection from multiple sources in a specific location, and for a particular group
(Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2002), local and external actors in the Mozambique peacebuilding
process. A single case study approach is particularly valuable for studying the pathways to
sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique, as it allows me to pay particular attention to the
historical context, which is important for an in-depth analysis. As Gerring (2007) explains, a
single case study approach such as the one presented here can be more valuable than studies that
pursue “fleeting knowledge” from a large number of contexts. “We gain better understanding of
the whole by focusing on a key part” (p. 1).
Second, the decision to apply a single qualitative case study approach was also based on
the fact that while the rare process of “post-conflict success” as observed in Mozambique is not fit
for statistical testing, it still holds great potential for qualitative analysis and theory development
(George & Bennett, 2005). Third, and perhaps, the overarching reason for adopting the single
case study approach is that it does not run the risk of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970,
1984), which is a problem often confronted by statistical and large comparative studies that
subject quite dissimilar cases to “one-size-fits-all” analytical frameworks. Moreover, the single
case study approach allows for high levels of internal validity because it enables the researcher to
identify and analyze those indicators that best capture the underlying theoretical concepts
(Maxwell, 1992).
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However, case studies also suffer from some weaknesses. These include bias in case
selection, indeterminacy problems, and low external validity. In the context of this study, I
address these single case study shortcomings by a focused logic of case selection and very
specific objectives in the actual case study research.
Sources of Data for this Study
In order to conduct the research and gather the data required for this paper, I used several
research tools. First, I engaged in an extensive desk study, reviewing the existing literature, and
collecting secondary data on Mozambique peacebuilding from international development and
non-governmental organizations in order to deepen my knowledge of the empirical terrain and to
identify existing knowledge and analytical gaps. I complemented this basic research method with
five months of fieldwork in Mozambique, during which time I utilized four methodological
approaches: semi-structured interviews, archival research/process tracing, focus group discussions
(FGDs), and non-participant observation. Though the four methods in themselves present an
incomplete picture, the triangulation strategy (see Denzin, 1978, 2006) that I employed enabled
me to construct a comprehensive account of the dynamics of peacebuilding in Mozambique since
1992. First, I conducted 91 interviews with two groups of actors, broadly defined: (1) local and
(2) international actors. The first group consisted of actors originating from within Mozambique
who are knowledgeable about the project or played important roles in the pre-war, wartime, or
post-war period. These included politicians and party leaders, civil servants, religious and
traditional leaders, peace mediators, media practitioners, academics, and members of civil society
organizations (CSOs).
The second group consisted of international officials who have worked in Mozambique
since the end of the war. These included staff of international organizations such as the United
Nations or donor agencies, including Department for International Development (DfID), United
States via its Agency for International Development (USAID), “Swedish International
Development Agency” (SIDA); as well as international NGOs and consultants. In order to guard
against bias and reflect diverse perspectives, I conducted the semi-structured interviews at
multiple sites in the southern, central, and northern regions of Mozambique (Maputo – southern
region, Beira – central region, and Nampula – northern region) from May to October 2015, with
the aim of obtaining a wide range of perspectives. On average, the interviews typically lasted
between 45 minutes and one hour but sometimes up to two hours and covered a broad range of
4

issues depending on the respondent’s experience or expertise. Out of 91 participants, 63 were
local actors. The remaining 28 consisted of international actors.
Apart from conducting interviews, I also collected documentary and/or archival
information in Mozambique. Archival resources are especially useful for case study construction
as they are stable, broad, and exact (Yin, 2003). The bulk of this took place at the National
Archive of Mozambique, in Maputo, and Eduardo Mondlane University, where I spent a few
weeks reviewing thousands of valuable pages of unpublished documents. These documents
provided a wealth of information about the processes and dynamics through which peacebuilding
policies have been discussed, negotiated, and implemented by both local and external actors in
Mozambique.
Finally, in addition to interviews, archival research, and process tracing, this paper is also
grounded in observation of non-participants and focus group discussions (FGDs). In analyzing the
data, transcripts of interviews with local and external actors were coded in order to identify key
themes and issues arising from the data. It became clear that the emergent analytic categories
corresponded well with the three findings presented in the introduction, but I will limit my
discussion in this paper to the role of the United Nations and the broader international community
in Mozambican peacebuilding process. However, before diving into the discussion of the key
findings, I first (briefly) provide the causes of civil war in Mozambique as a necessary first step in
order to set the historical scene for ensuing discussions about the pathways to sustainable peace in
Mozambique.
The Causes of Civil War in Mozambique: External or Internal Causes?
In 1977, just two years after independence from Portugal, Mozambique embarked on
sixteen years of civil war that left the country economically damaged and politically fragile. The
underlying causes of the civil war have been the subject of controversy and have tended to
polarize around two opposing ideological positions. The first line of argument is that the war in
Mozambique was an externally sponsored project of destabilization against the Frelimo led
government in the context of the South African apartheid regime’s “total strategy” for the region,
and conservative Western concern about a communist-inspired government providing an
alternative development model for other African states (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983; Hanlon,
1984; Fauvet, 1984). Here, the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) is
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seen as a puppet force, set up and sustained by external support, with no real political program or
intent to govern, and no domestic power base (Hanlon, 1984).
The opposing argument is that the causes of the war in Mozambique were mainly
internally driven. Particularly prominent among these researchers were Geffray (1988), Geffray
and Pedersen (1988), Otto Roesch (1988, 1992), and Cahen, (1984). Their central argument was
that uneven development between the northern and southern regions, exclusion of the northern
elites from government, and more importantly, Frelimo Marxist-Leninist ideology and social
policy initiatives played a major role in the onset and persistence of the conflict (Sitoe 2004;
Sambanis, 2003; Cahen, 1998; Flower, 1997; Newitt, 1995; De Brito, 1991).
In this paper, I take a step back from the polarizing debates about external and internal
causes and focus centrally on their interactions. My argument is that both external and internal
factors are complementary and do not substitute each other. Because at every point in
Mozambique’s conflict, external actors played a crucial role—providing the means to mobilize
domestic grievances, the resources to wage a protracted war, and the financial incentives to end
the war (Weinstein & Francisco, 2005). Similarly, Frelimo’s policy errors during its radical
socialist policy phase, and in particular, the secular zeal of the Frelimo government in
disrespecting both the religious and traditional leaders, certainly contributed to the onset,
duration, and the intensity of the war (Chan & Venancio, 1998).
Legacies of the War
By the end of the war in 1992, an estimated one million people (7 percent of the
population) had died, five million others had been forcibly displaced, 60 percent of all primary
schools and 31 percent of clinics had been destroyed, and the economic damage totaled $20
billion (Adedokun, 2016; Miller & Ferris, 2015). The psychological impact of the war was even
more devastating. Every Mozambican has probably lost a friend, relative, neighbor, or at least an
acquaintance. Gehrke (1991) described the situation in Mozambique in the 1980s as one of the
worst humanitarian crises in the world, while others have called it a holocaust.
Peace Initiatives in Mozambique
In light of the negative consequences of Mozambique’s war, several attempts at resolving
the conflict and stabilizing the country were explored in the 1980s and 1990s. These included the
1984 Nkomati Peace Talks, the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process, and the 1992 Rome General Peace
Agreement. Though the Nkomati Peace Talks and the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process failed in all
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senses to produce a durable peace, a sustainable negotiated treaty was reached in Rome, Italy, in
1992. I will limit my analysis in this section to the Rome General Peace Agreement.
Mozambique’s Transition from War to Peace: Rome General Peace Agreement as a Guide
After the collapse of the Nairobi peace talks in 1989 as discussed above, representatives of
Frelimo and Renamo finally met for a first round of direct negotiations and peace talks in Rome
during the month of July in 1990. The Rome peace negotiations were hosted and mediated by the
Italian government and the Roman Catholic Sant’ Egidio community, an Italian Catholic lay order
and voluntary charitable organization, and were observed by Mozambique’s major donors,
including the U.S, UK, Portugal, and Germany. After twelve rounds of peace talks, the General
Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed on 4 October 1992 by Joachim Chissano, the President of
Mozambique and leader of Frelimo, and by Afonso Dhlakama, the President of Renamo. The
General Peace Agreement consisted of seven protocols designed to address both the formal
resolution of Mozambique’s civil war, and the establishment of a new political system meant to
provide the basis for lasting peace and political stability (Alden, 1995; Manning, 2002; Dobbins
et.al., 2005).
The Rome General Peace Agreement was only a guiding instrument to end the sixteenyear war. How peace was eventually attained in Mozambique remains unanswered by most
scholars (Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Nowak, 2010). Observers and theorists of the Mozambican
peace process have long argued that Mozambique’s transition from war to peace lay in one of five
reasons. First, a lengthy military stalemate made it clear to both Renamo and Frelimo that neither
could win a decisive military victory (Lloyd, 1995, p.153). Second, external aid to both parties
(both in terms of financial and technical support) had been significantly reduced. With the end of
the Cold War, support for an ideological battle between Mozambique's Marxist-leaning
government and the rebels disappeared, as did their sponsors (Walter, 1999, p.145; Berman, 1996,
pp. 19-20). Third, a worsening drought threatened the country with mass starvation, making it
increasingly difficult for both sides to feed their soldiers and supporters (Alden & Simpson, 1993,
p.126; Ohlson, Stedman & Davies, 1994, pp. 113-116). Fourth, Mozambique was a “unique case”
or it was simply that good fortunes guided the peace process (Hume, 1994). Similarly, other
scholars have suggested that “hidden hands” had paid off the rebels and “bought” peace in
Mozambique (Vines, 1998). Finally, a large number of studies based on a “liberal peace thesis”
debunk existing studies and suggest that peace came to Mozambique as a singular result of the
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heavy external intervention, and that without the intervention the same outcome would not have
prevailed (Bekoe, 2008; Manning, 2002; Stedman, 1997).
While the last explanation points in the right direction, I argue that it does not get to the
heart of the matter, partly because: (a) it ignores the strategies and tools adopted by the
international community to facilitate Mozambican peacebuilding process; (b) it focuses on
Mozambique’s transition from war to peace, and does not capture the factors that sustain the
transition. Therefore, while existing studies have offered useful analyses on the Mozambican
peacebuilding trajectory, they have tended to overlook the most important causal mechanisms and
processes employed by the UN and the international community. The next section provides a
theoretical argument that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations
increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs. Subsequent sections subject this argument
to empirical testing.
Theoretical Argument: Why Credible and Impartial International Support Through the UN
Increases the Survival of Peace After Civil War
Drawing from, and building upon, the established findings of peace scholars such as
Caplan, Hoeffler, and Brinkman (2015), Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohne (2008), Doyle and Sambanis
(2006), and Fortna (2008)—that external actors contribute to conflict resolution and post-war
development—I also argue that external actors not only facilitate the transition from war to peace,
but also contribute to the sustainability of peace after the transition. This argument raises an
important question: why are external actors critical to the sustainability of peace after war? The
bargaining model of war tells us that there are three main sources of problems for states emerging
from civil war. The first difficulty is information asymmetry (Slantchev, 2003). The second
source of problems as to why peace could break down in the absence of external actors relates to
issues of indivisibility of stakes in the conflict (Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2003). The third challenge
for states emerging from war is a commitment problem (Walter, 1997; 2009; Fearon, 1995).
This begs the question: how can external actors contribute to effective conflict resolution
and the sustainability of peace after war? The existing literature presents several arguments to
address this question. First, external actors can escalate the costs among the warring parties for
reigniting war. Second, since bargaining theory suggests that war is a result of misperceptions and
an inability to effectively transmit credible information, a third party can facilitate the transfer of
information among the combatants. Third, external actors can “shame” belligerents into ceasing
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violence and accept a peace agreement and/or tenable compromise (see Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;
Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2008; Osborn, 2013). Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, a third
party/external actor can also use its peacebuilding operations’ tools to overcome the credible
commitment problem. Budget support or foreign aid, DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance
schemes, for example, are designed to enforce the terms of peace agreements and thus build trust
for former combatant groups that the peace will endure.
However, not all external peacebuilders or third parties will serve these purposes
adequately. Essentially, external peacebuilders fall into two groups: unilateral and multilateral
peacebuilders. In the context of this study, multilateral peacebuilding means an UN-authorized
mission that reflects a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council:
China, France, Russia, the U.S., and United Kingdom (UK). By contrast, if a state engages in
peacebuilding mission without the UN authorization, the action is defined as unilateral
peacebuilding. Examples of unilateral peacebuilding missions thus include cases when a state
engages in peacebuilding operations along with its allies without authorization from the UN.
Here, I argue that a unilateral peacebuilding mission is likely to impede the development
of war-torn states and also reduce sustainable peace. Unilateral peacebuilders often intend to
expand influence on target states, thereby ensuring their own security interests and gaining
political and economic benefits (Autesserre, 2010; Dobbins et al., 2005; Sambanis & SchulhoferWohl, 2005; Waltz, 1979; Levi, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). However, unlike
unilateral peacebuilding missions that often support one side of the belligerents and attempt to
alter the balance of power for strategic interests, including the maintenance of regional influence,
the expansion of markets as well as access to natural resources (Morgenthau, 1967; Regan, 2002;
Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006), multilateral peacebuilding missions under the auspices of
the UN contribute to negotiated settlement by helping ensure that the current power distribution
remains static (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Regan, 2000). Hence, multilateral
peacebuilding missions do not intend to benefit or disadvantage a particular group (Barnett &
Weiss, 2008), and thus do not face national resistance. According to Finnemore (2003), “peacebuilding operation must be multilateral to be legitimate and indeed successful; without
multilateralism, claims of humanitarian or peacebuilding motivation and justification are suspect”
(p. 73).
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There are three main reasons why multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN
should contribute to sustainable peace compared to unilateral peacebuilding missions. First, the
UN with high moral authority and international legitimacy can incentivize civil war combatants to
cooperate for disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) by affecting soldiers’
morale, focusing international attention on non-cooperative groups, and providing direct benefits
for cooperation (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). DDR strategy enables a post-war
country to divert both material and human resources allocated to military uses to important and
urgent social programs, such as the improvement of education, access to public health services,
and decent infrastructure. In this way, it can be argued that a multilateral peacebuilding under the
leadership of the UN contributes to the increase of resources available for post-war reconstruction
by helping resource diversion and thereby facilitating sustainable peace after war.
Second, given their commitment to humanitarian concerns, multilateral peacebuilding
missions through the UN often accompany humanitarian and development aid, which
invariably increase resources available for post-war development. Besides DDR, UN peace
operations can include large-scale development efforts to assist in post-war reconstruction, such
as refugee resettlement programs, demining initiatives, the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of
roads, schools, health facilities, and food aid (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Howard, 2008). Such
UN-led programs and activities can contribute to citizens’ well-being and post-conflict peace and
stability. Third, and finally, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN can encourage
sharing of costs for post-war reconstruction; for which the fixed burden-sharing mechanism of the
UN provides an institutional solution that reduces the risks of bargaining failures, decreases
transaction costs, and alleviates the problem of free riders (Kim, 2013).
Multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN are not without criticism, however
(see, Dobbins et. al., 2007; MacGinty, 2008; Richmond, 2009, 2010; Newman, Paris, &
Richmond, 2009). The UN attempts to change political and economic systems of post-war states
can undermine a government’s sovereignty and accountability (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Richmond,
2011). However, in civil war affected societies, international assistance may matter more than
sovereignty for physical well-being of citizens at least temporarily, as long as it is not motivated
by the unilateral peacebuilders’ self-interest, but by multilateral peacebuilding missions through
the UN, which are largely driven by humanitarian and development concerns (Doyle & Sambanis
2006).
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Translating these arguments to the post-conflict peacebuilding context, we can infer that
an external peacebuilding mission will be most successful when it is led and/or authorized by the
UN (employing instruments such as DDR, humanitarian and relief efforts, political assistance,
and budget support), rather than a unilateral peacebuilding mission led by the United States or
Russia. These conditions were all met in Mozambique, primarily because of the partnership
between the United Nations, regional actors and the presence of a large and varied network of
experienced and committed donors. The following section empirically shows that Mozambique’s
successful transition from war to peace is a product of multilateral peacebuilding through the
United Nations, and not unilateral.
How the UN and the Broader International Community Contributed
to Sustainable Peace in Mozambique
Having outlined theoretically the importance and positive effects of international
community to sustainable peace under the auspices of the UN in the previous section, the analysis
now turns to empirical material from Mozambique. As Ball and Barnes (2000) pointed out,
bilateral donors, as well as NGOS, created several forums, both formal and informal, to
coordinate assistance for peace implementation in Mozambique (pp. 16-17). More importantly,
the Security Council Resolution 797 established the United Nation Operations in Mozambique
(ONUMOZ) in December 1992 to help implement the General Peace Agreement signed on 4
October 1992 by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo.
Although the United Nations Operations mandate’s in Mozambique formally came to an end on 9
December 1994, the UN is still present in Mozambique today and continues to influence the
country’s post-war peace in four ways: (1) Security/DDR assistance, (2) Humanitarian assistance,
(3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Below, I explore each of these
strategies one after the other.
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (1): Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
The UN, together with a committed group of bilateral donors, played a vital role in
advancing and promoting peace and security in Mozambique. The DDR component of the UN
strategy in Mozambique was unique in two ways. First, The UN provided specialized counselling
and vocation training to ex-combatants based on their needs. Second, unlike in the cases of
Angola and South Sudan, where the UN conducted elections before demobilization, the UN
prioritized in the case of Mozambique the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
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before the first election was conducted in 1994. Significantly, ONUMOZ and donor agencies
helped to establish a new Mozambican Defense Force—consisting of both the government and
the opposition. According to many interview participants, “military inclusion gives feelings of
physical security and confidence to the opposition” (Interviewees No. 11, 17, 21, and 26).
Although the overall progress of the DDR and the security sector reform including the
professionalism of the military is still an important policy issue in Mozambique to-date, some
success has been made. ONUMOZ, with the help of UN-OCHA and other UN agencies and
donors, was able to demobilize and reintegrate about 100,000 combatants from both sides.
Seventy percent of demobilized soldiers who received training ended up with secure employment
after the departure from the camps (Morgan & Mvududu, 2000, p. 16). Several years after the
Peace Agreement, demobilized soldiers had been well integrated into the communities of their
choice (Kane, 1998). ONUMOZ collected more than 200,000 weapons and gave them to the
newly formed Mozambican Defense Force. The United Nations also helped establish a National
Mine Clearance Plan to clear an initial 4,000 kilometers of roads, develop a mine awareness
program, and educate the population on the dangers of land mines.
Similarly, reduction of military expenditure has been realized. Before 1994, defense
spending was the largest single item in the annual budget expenditure. With UN and donors
support, however, resources have been shifted towards social sectors. For instance, from 1994 to
2014 budgets, the education and health ministries benefited from significant increases in both
capital and recurrent allocations while funds for the military and other security agencies were cut
down. The trend continued in the 2015 budget (see table 2 below).
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (2): Humanitarian Assistance
The UN system and development donors also championed humanitarian and relief efforts
in Mozambique. One unique aspect of a broader UN approach to humanitarian assistance program
in Mozambique was UNOCHA’s decentralized administrative structure that was replicated at
both national and provincial levels. This initiative led to the introduction of emergency assistance
in all eleven provinces and helped manage the long-term elements of the demobilization process
(Interviewee no. 65). Representatives from the Government, Renamo, and several Western
powers, as well as South Africa, organized the various aspects of the assistance program.
UNOCHA's central office in Maputo provided overall coordination of the humanitarian efforts.
An information and Referral Service and Reintegration Support Scheme were set up to inform ex12

combatants about available support and employment opportunities and to provide them with
financial assistance for 24 months. According to many interview participants:
The decentralization of the UN approach to humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial
and district levels made Mozambique humanitarian assistance the most successful ever
undertaken by the United Nations. Within two years after the peace agreement, over 1.7
million refugees returned to their homeland. (Interviewees No. 1, 5, 17, & 75)
Similarly, more than 4.5 million internally displaced Mozambicans are believed to have returned
home during the same period (UNHCR, 1998). According to a UN respondent:
The underlying rationale for humanitarian assistance is that if humanitarian capacity
building is well implemented, it can build resilience at the community level; assist
national actors in developing the ability to cope with current and future crisis; and more
importantly, it can contribute to a more sustainable peace without compromising the
principles of humanitarian assistance which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence. (Interviewee no. 75).
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (3): Political Party Development and Electoral Assistance
Recognizing that political participation is a critical component of peace and stability, the
UN provided financial support directly for the transformation of Renamo, the rebel group, into a
political party. The UN created two trust funds in order to: (1) support all registered political
parties (17 parties received U.S. $150,000 each), and (2) support the transformation of Renamo
into a political party. It is worth mentioning that Mozambique was one of the “litmus tests” in
which the UN provided financial support directly for the development of political parties
(Manning & Malbrough, 2009). This was considered a major landmark of the Mozambican peace
process.
Although the UN spearheaded the “money for peace” initiative, thirteen bilateral donors,
including the European Commission, largely funded it. For example, Italy made the largest
contribution, over $11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a
combined total of over $1.96 million to Renamo’s trust fund, with the Netherlands the fourth
largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States (Manning & Malbrough,
2009).
According to Aldo Ajello (1999 p.123), chief of the UN mission and the Representative of
the UN Secretary-General to Mozambique:
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The Trust Fund played a crucial role for the success of the mission […] the two parties
needed to have enough political and economic capital to dissuade them from returning to
war […] that the peace would only prevail if both parties felt that it was beneficial for
their interests […] in this operation it was also important to give particular attention to
Renamo which, at the beginning, had nothing to lose. (as cited in Nuvunga, 2007, p.11)
As a UN interview participant noted: “The existence of viable opposition parties is an essential
instrument to the success of the peace process, and money is key” (Interviewee no.11). The
Renamo’s Chief negotiator, Raul Domingos, summed it up in a statement on 16 June 1992: “there
is no democracy without money” (Vine, 1996, p. 144).
Following the development of political parties, the UN, in conjunction with development
donors, established an independent national electoral commission (CNE) (Interviewees no. 2; 4;
6, & 19). The first national elections in Mozambique were held in October 1994. The incumbent
President, Mr. Chissano, won the presidential election with 53.3 percent of the votes. The leader
of Renamo, Mr. Dhlakama, received 33.7 percent of the votes. The candidate receiving the third
largest number of votes (2.9 percent) was Mr. Wehia Ripua of the Partido Democrático de
Moçambique (Pademo). Both local and international observers judged the Mozambique elections
of 1994 as free and fair. Since the transitional multi-party elections were held in 1994, the
democratic process has been consolidated by four subsequently national elections (1999, 2004,
2009, and 2014). Frelimo has won a majority in parliament and the presidency in each of the
general elections (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1. Mozambican Elections, 1994 –2014

Source: Azevedo-Harman (2015)

The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (4): Budget Support
Alongside the use of DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance, the UN and donor
agencies also employed budget support as a strategy to sustain peace and development in
Mozambique. Since the peace settlement in 1992, Mozambique has been recognized as one of the
largest recipients of direct budget support in the world. Budget support accounts for 30 percent of
the Mozambican state budget, provided by nineteen development partners (International
Monetary Fund, 2015). In the table below, for example, budget support increased almost threefold between 2004 to 2012: from just under $160 million to about $450 million.
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Table 1: Budget Support Disbursements by Development Partners, 2004-2012

Source: Direccão Nacional do Tesouro – Ministry of Finance (2012).

By definition budget support is the provision of aid directly to the state budget. Budget
support for sustainable peacebuilding is grounded in National Poverty Reduction Strategy
Document (known by its Portuguese acronym PARPA). The PARPA is a five-year program and
is jointly prepared by the Government of Mozambique, development partners, and CSOs. The
PARPA has four main objectives that are considered critical to achieve sustainable
peacebuilding: (a) rural and agricultural development; (b) poverty and macroeconomic
management; (c) governance; and (d) human and social development, especially health and
education.
Through budget support, total spending on the priority sectors designated in PARPA has
more than quadrupled in nominal terms between 2004 and 2012, increasing by more than 7
percentage points of GDP (see table below). Similarly, as a percentage of total expenditure,
education, health, agriculture, good governance, and infrastructure, together with the other
smaller priority sectors, have increased their share from 61 percent to just over 67 percent of
total spending. The bottom line here is that: budgetary allocations—boosted by Budget Support
disbursements—have been consistent with the planned expansion of priority sectors outlined in
PARP (see table 2).
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Table 2: Influence of Budget Support on Sectors Relevant to Peacebuilding

Sources: Ministry of Finance & Fiscal tables from the Bank of Mozambique (for years 2005-2011)
and *IMF Article IV estimates (2012)

How successful has budget support been in contributing to sustainable peacebuilding in
Mozambique? Although the answer to this question is not straightforward, there is evidence of
remarkable and track-able progress in education, health, and good governance—all of which
imply predictors of stable societies. Consider education for example: between 1980 and 2014,
Mozambique’s human development score increased 75 percent, or an average annual increase of
about 1.66 percent—a better performance than Zimbabwe or Angola, two countries in the region
that had a similar score to Mozambique in 1980. This performance has been driven by a jump in
life expectancy at birth, rising from 46 years in 1995 to 55 in 2014, and a leap in income per
capita, from $233 in 1995 to $585 in 2014 (constant 2011 U.S. dollars, purchasing power parity)
(World Bank, 2016). The UNDP Education Index, which reflects both literacy and enrollment,
also shows an improvement between 1995 and 2011 (UNDP Report, 2014): in 2011, 90 percent
of school-aged children were enrolled in basic education, which is a significant improvement
from the rate of 56 percent in 1995. Similarly, the secondary school net enrollment rate (NER)
more than doubled from 8.2 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 2009. In terms of provincial trends,
progress was made across all provinces both in primary and secondary enrolment, thereby
reducing regional educational inequality (see figure 2 below).
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Figure 2. Net Enrolment Rates (NER), Primary and Secondary Schooling by Region 2002/03
and 2008/09

Source: Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2015

There are several reasons why education improvements, for example, should contribute
to sustainable peacebuilding. First, according to a World Bank report (Aoki et al., 2002),
government investment in education is a means by which governments can make a direct and
lasting positive impact on people’s lives, which may directly reduce the level of grievances in
society. Second, the expansion of public spending in education can reduce grievances and
conflict by spurring economic development and social equality (Thyne, 2006). According to
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), rebel recruitment costs more and rebellion is less likely the higher
the level of education in a society. Third, education promotes a culture of peace (Sargent, 1996).
As Lipset (1959) pointed out: “Education presumably broadens men’s outlook, enables them to
understand the needs for norms of tolerance, restraining them from adhering to extremist and
monistic doctrines” (p. 79). In line with this, several scholars hold that higher educational
attainment reduces the risk of political violence by encouraging political participation and
channeling conflicts of interest through institutional pathways rather than through the use of
violence (e.g., Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003; Huntington, 1968). More recently,
education has also been argued (especially primary and secondary education) to promote social
cohesion, such as learning how to work together peacefully, which in turn enables peace and

18

political stability (Smith, 2010). Thus, the case of Mozambique shows that generous budget
support, especially when it is rightly targeted, can help to consolidate the peace process.
Conclusion
Although a combination of factors was responsible for the emergence and survival of
peace and stability in Mozambique, this paper has argued that one of the most important factors
behind Mozambique’s success was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of the United
Nations, Western powers, and major donors, who were committed to making peace work and
had long-standing relationships with the both Frelimo and Renamo. The paper further shows that
any assessment of the UN and the broader international community’s role and performance in
support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four
intervention strategies or instruments, namely: (1) DDR assistance, (2) humanitarian assistance,
(3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Overall, the Mozambican case
reinforces many of the findings from the literature on the role of third-party guarantors in
securing negotiated peace settlements. Specifically, it provides insight into the argument that
external peacebuilding led by the UN is more likely to be successful than a unilateral
peacebuilding by a powerful state without UN approval.
But, while it is perhaps difficult to overstate the importance and the positive contributions
of the UN and the broader international community in the promotion of peace and democracy in
Mozambique, it is also noteworthy to point out that development donors often have their own
agendas that are not suitable or in the interests of the local people. In the case of Mozambique,
however, the efforts and agendas of the development donors were moderated by the involvement
of “local actors.” Here, the first key actors include the Christian Council of Mozambique, which
consists of the Catholic, Anglican and Protestant churches, with the constant support of the
community of Sant’ Egidio, an Italian Catholic NGO, which enjoyed the confidence of both the
government and Renamo. Finally, there is also evidence that the avoidance of post-conflict
relapse in Mozambique since 1992 can also be traced to the continued existence of “inclusive
political settlement.”
While much progress has been achieved in building a more peaceful polity in
Mozambique through the United Nations and the broader international community, there are also
challenges. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that signs of peace and progress
notwithstanding, Mozambique still faces a large number of social and economic problems:
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poverty, unemployment, natural resource boom, increasing political exclusion, dependence on
foreign aid, and low access to social and economic services and facilities. Of course, this is not to
dismiss Mozambique’s achievements, but rather to demonstrate that post-conflict peacebuilding
is contentious, haphazard, and non-linear process. For this reason, Mozambican stakeholders and
their international counterparts should consider prioritizing inclusive institutions and promoting
economic development in order for Mozambique to continue to be a model of sustainable peace
after civil war.
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